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to the Chapter 11 Stamp Tax Exemption
Lindsay K. Taft†
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis has wreaked havoc on the U.S. economy.
It has contributed to the failure of businesses, a decline in consumer
wealth, and a substantial downturn in economic activity. Many companies, small and large, have contemplated or will be forced to contemplate
bankruptcy. In fact, during the federal judiciary’s fiscal year ending September 2008, corporate bankruptcies were up 49% from the previous fiscal year.1
Bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11, the Chapter most
prominently used by corporations, seeks to aid financially troubled entities by capturing and preserving any value remaining in the company.2
Under reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, the company continues
to operate and can do so with a little breathing room. The company no
longer fears harassment from creditors or potential litigation, but is able
to formulate a plan for rehabilitation with the hope of eventually returning to a viable state.3 When the company reorganizes, all parties involved benefit; with the company in a more stable financial position,
more claims are paid to creditors, jobs are saved, and returns can still be
produced for stockholders.4
†
Candidate for J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Business Administration, University of Washington, 2006. The author would like to thank her parents, Mike and Anne Taft, and
her brother and sister-in-law, Ben and Katie Taft, whose love, support, and endless supply of lawyer
jokes not only kept things in perspective but also made law school manageable. She would also like
to thank Professor Rafeal Pardo for inspiring this Comment and for all of his comments, criticism,
and encouragement. Finally, special thanks to the Seattle University Law Review staff, especially
Lindsay Noel, Alexis Toma, and James Beebe, for their helpful editing suggestions.
1. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Over One Million for Fiscal Year 2008 (Dec.
15,
2008)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilingsDec2008.cfm.
2. 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2797 (2010).
3. 10 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 Note (3d ed.
2010) [hereinafter NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC.].
4. See id.
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In a typical Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor drafts a reorganization plan.5 This plan details how much, and in what form, each creditor
will be paid; the amount of interest, if any, stockholders will retain; and
how the business will operate in the future.6 In addition, the plan may
also include the terms of any proposed sales of the debtor’s assets.7 The
Bankruptcy Code then requires that, after the creditors have divided up
into classes of substantially similar claims, they vote.8 If all of the creditors approve the reorganization plan, it is then submitted to the bankruptcy court for confirmation—official approval.9 Conversely, through their
vote, creditors can veto a sale if their claims are “impaired”—e.g., those
that preclude receiving payment in full. By vetoing the reorganization
plan, creditors can prevent the entire plan’s confirmation.10 If no creditors object and the court approves the reorganization plan, the plan is
confirmed and the debtor emerges as a reorganized company.11
To generate the funds needed for a Chapter 11 reorganization, assets may be sold at any time under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.12 The
Chapter 11 reorganization process costs money,13 and more often than
not, a financially strapped company will find it “impossible or imprudent” to wait to sell off its assets until confirmation of a plan at the end
of a Chapter 11 case.14 Section 363 allows a trustee or debtor in possession (DIP),15 with the court’s approval, to “use, sell, or lease, other than
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2009).
6. Id. § 1123.
7. Paul D. Leake & Mark G. Douglas, Testing the Limits of the Chapter 11 Transfer Tax Exemption: In Search of the Meaning of “Under a Plan Confirmed,” 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 839, 842
(2005).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2009).
9. Id. §§ 1128–1129.
10. Leake & Douglas, supra note 7. However, if enough creditors vote in favor of the plan, the
court has the option to “cram down” the plan on those creditors that do not vote in favor of the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
11. NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra note 3. If the debtor fails to obtain approval within the
prescribed time limits, the Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding will be converted into a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2009).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2009).
13. See Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation
Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization Bankruptcy, 61 J. FIN. 1253 (2006). Reorganizations are expensive because they impose upon the debtor both direct and indirect costs. Id. Direct bankruptcy costs
are the out-of-pocket expenditures associated with the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which include
filing fees, lawyer fees, accountant fees, expert witness fees, trustee fees, and other out-of-pocket
administrative costs. Id. at 1278. In addition, bankruptcy also imposes certain indirect costs, such as
lost opportunities, time spent in bankruptcy, and lost sales or profits. Id. at 1270.
14. Steven A. Meyerowitz, Supreme Court “Bright Line” Ruling on Scope of Chapter 11
Transfer Tax Exemption is Bad News for Pre-Confirmation Asset Sales in Bankruptcy, J. BANKR. L.
2008.09-1 (2008).
15. Once the debtor files his petition for relief under Chapter 11, the debtor automatically
assumes an additional identity as DIP. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (2009). A DIP typically refers to the deb-
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in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.”16 These sales
provide the distressed companies with many benefits, including greater
leverage with creditors, less oversight and review than under a Chapter
11 confirmation, and fewer disclosure requirements.17 Moreover, as an
additional benefit to debtors and purchasers, sales under § 363, under
certain circumstances,18 cleanse the assets of any prior liens and most
claims and liabilities.19 Finally, a debtor company further benefits from
this provision because a sale can be made at any time after the filing for
bankruptcy and is usually relatively quick, which allows the company to
maximize the value of the asset.20
While these sales were initially used only when there was a compelling need, the recent trend has been to use pre-confirmation plan sales
much more frequently.21 Companies have realized that these sales often
provide a “cheaper and quicker exit from bankruptcy.”22 In terms of
overall numbers, thirty-two pre-confirmation plan sales worth $1.6 billion were announced in the first quarter of 2008 as compared with twenty-one such sales worth $888 million in the first quarter of 2007.23 These
numbers are only expected to increase given the jump in overall Chapter
11 filings.24 Indeed, companies as large as Lehman Brothers have taken
this route. The global financial-service firm sold its capital markets and
investment banking businesses under a pre-plan sale for $1.7 billion.25
Unfortunately, due to a recent Supreme Court decision, a portion of
these sales suffered a setback. In June of 2008, in Florida Department of
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.,26 the Supreme Court settled a circuit split and issued a bright line rule stating that asset transfers made
tor’s original management that continues to maintain possession and control of the business during
the reorganization process. J. Seth Moore & Vincent P. Slusher, Bankruptcy Code Section 363
Sales: Trends and Opportunities, 9 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 2
(2007).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2009).
17. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).
19. Id.
20. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15. By contrast, a sale pursuant to a plan involves a prolonged notice period and a two-step approval process: (1) a disclosure statement and (2) confirmation of the plan. NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., supra note 3.
21. See Moore & Vincent, supra note 15.
22. Moore & Vincent, supra note 15; Brief for Professors Richard Aaron et al. as Amici Curae
Supporting Respondent at 19, Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S.
Ct. 2326 (2008) (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 494942.
23. Avital Louria Hahn, An Epilogue to Chapter 11, CFO MAG., May 1, 2008, available at
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11079995?f=related.
24. Id.
25. Press Release, Orrick Client Alert, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Asset Sale Summary
(Oct. 31, 2008) (on file with author).
26. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006).
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prior to the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization no longer
benefit from certain tax exemptions.27 As a result, the cost of selling assets in a bankruptcy case outside of a plan will increase.
The provision at issue in the case, which exempts asset transfers
and sales from certain state taxes, contains language ambiguous enough
that four federal circuit courts have contemplated which types of asset
sales qualify for the tax benefit.28 Although the Supreme Court set a
bright line rule that brings clarity and simplicity to the provision, the
Court ignored the intent behind the provision, and the Court’s decision
may ultimately result in the exemption’s obsolescence. As a result, Congress should adopt a revised provision that nullifies the Supreme Court’s
Piccadilly decision in order to stay true to the purpose behind the Code.
This Comment analyzes the Piccadilly opinion and its practical effects. Part II discusses the history and purpose of the stamp tax exemption within the Bankruptcy Code. Part III discusses the circuit split resolved by Piccadilly and addresses the problems each side presents. Part
IV first presents the background and procedural history of Piccadilly and
then summarizes the Supreme Court’s creation of the bright line rule and
decision to limit the tax exemption to post confirmation transfers. Part V
critiques the Court’s decision and suggests that Congress reject the Supreme Court’s bright line rule and revise the statute to remove the temporal limitation and add a notice provision. In addition, Part V addresses
the suggested revision’s application and its potential pitfalls. Finally,
Part VI concludes and briefly comments on the future impacts of the decision.
II. TAX EXEMPT TRANSFERS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Bankruptcy Code contains several “special tax provisions” relating to Chapter 11 business reorganization.29 This Part and Part III discuss one such provision, § 1146(a). Section 1146(a) exempts any stamp
or similar tax imposed by state or local authorities on “the issuance,
transfer or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed” under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.30
27. Id. at 2339.
28. Compare City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d
840, 841 (2d Cir. 1985), and Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. T.H. Orlando Ltd., et al. (In re T.H. Orlando Ltd.),
391 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2004), with NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR,
L.P.), 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999), and Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In re
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.), 335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (2009).
30. Id. § 1146(a). Before October 17, 2005, 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) was previously designated as
§ 1146(c). However, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
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The purpose and origins of the stamp tax exemption aid in understanding its scope. The primary purpose of the special tax provisions is
to balance the objectives of state and local tax codes with those of the
Bankruptcy Code and therefore limit any negative effects these tax policies may have on the bankruptcy process.31 Thus, Congress enacted the
stamp tax exemption in order to provide relief from taxes that might be
imposed on the transfer of assets to a restructuring business.32 Congress’s objective in enacting the stamp tax exemption was simple: By
exempting the stamp tax, a larger amount of the profits generated by the
sale are available to creditors, and the likelihood the debtor will successfully emerge from reorganization increases.33
The stamp tax exemption originated under § 77B(f) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Act exempted from federal transfer taxes “the
issuance, transfers, or exchanges of securities or making or delivery of
conveyances to make effective any plan of reorganization confirmed under the provisions of this section.”34 Section 77B(f) was replaced with
§ 267 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, which expanded the stamp tax exemption to both state and federal taxes, and the language evolved from
transfers that serve “to make effective any plan” to those that arise “under any plan confirmed.”35, 36 The litigation surrounding the tax exemp(BAPCPA) of 2005, both §§ 1146(a) and 1146(b) were deleted. Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 719(b)(3), 119
Stat. 23, 133. The substance of the new subsection (a) is identical to that of the old subsection (c).
For simplicity, the provision will be referred to as the “stamp tax exemption.”
31. Robert A. Morse, Annotation, Exemption, Under 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c), From Payment of
Tax Under Any Law Imposing Stamp Tax or Similar Tax, 108 A.L.R. FED. 701 (1992).
32. John C. Murray, Transfer-Tax Considerations in Real Estate Bankruptcy Proceedings, 38
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 377, 379 (2003).
33. Id. Murray states the following:
Congress enacted [the stamp tax exemption] to facilitate reorganization by giving debtors
tax relief from stamp or similar tax, such as transfer taxes, for transfers of property pursuant to an instrument of transfer under a confirmed plan. By exempting the transaction
from tax, [the stamp tax exemption] reduces the obligations encumbering the property,
thereby making a greater portion of the sale proceeds available to creditors and affords
debtor a quick and efficient means of distributing and discharging its obligations under
the plan.
Id. (citing In re Kerner Printing Co. 188 B.R. 121, 124 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
34. Act of Jun. 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 Stat. 911, 919 (1934).
35. Act of Jun. 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 903–904 (1938). See generally 6A
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.08 at 836−837 (14th ed. 1977). H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 281
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6238. The leading contemporary bankruptcy treatise
asserts that the provision was not extended to exempt any taxes on transfers “which occur prior to
confirmation of the plan and which are merely prepatory steps.” 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 15.08, at 840. No reason was provided for why the language was changed. See 52 Stat. at 903–
904.
36. Congress used virtually the same language in the subsequent BAPCPA revisions, including
the phrase “under a plan confirmed.” 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (2009). With the BAPCPA revisions of
2005, Congress made several significant changes to the Bankruptcy Code while attempting to,
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tion provision has focused on two areas of debate: (1) the type of transfer
the exemption applies and (2) the proper timing of the transfer as dictated
by the language of the statute. This Part will address the first of these
issues, and Part III will discuss the timing issue as it relates to asset sales
under § 1146(a).
The provision’s application to various types of state taxes was the
first area of dispute. The stamp tax exemption specifically exempts a
“stamp tax or similar tax,”37 but the scope of the provision is unclear due
to the noticeable lack of a definition of stamp or similar tax within the
code. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a stamp tax as “a tax imposed by
requiring the purchase of a revenue stamp that must be affixed to a legal
document (such as a deed or note) before the document can be recorded.”38 Many courts have addressed this issue. The Second Circuit has
asserted that all stamp or similar taxes share the following elements:
(1) they are imposed only at the time of transfer or sale of the item
at issue; (2) the amount due is determined by the consideration for,
par value of, or value of the time being transferred; (3) the tax rate
is a relatively small percentage of the consideration, par value or
value of the property; (4) the tax is imposed irrespective of whether
the transferor enjoyed a gain or suffered a loss on the underlying
sale or transfer; and (5) in the case of state documentary transfer
taxes, the tax must be paid as a prerequisite to recording.39, 40

Thirty-seven states impose a tax that is covered by the statute at either
the state, county, or municipal level.41 These taxes, most commonly used
on the recording of deeds, mortgages, or leases, are generally a very
small percentage of the overall transaction (typically 1% or less).42 Despite their seemingly nominal value, the classification of these taxes, as
well as when they may be tax exempt, generates significant controversy.

among other things, make it more difficult for some consumers to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
Id.
37. Id. § 1146(a).
38. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed. 2009).
39. 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P. v. N.Y. St. Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. (In re 995 Fifth Ave.
Assocs. L.P.), 963 F.2d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 1992).
40. In contrast, courts have also ruled that sales and capital gains taxes are not considered
stamp taxes because they are too high and, unlike stamp taxes, are imposed solely for gain or profit.
Murray, supra note 32, at 385.
41. Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Fla. Dep’t
of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008) (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 345045.
42. National Association of Realtors, Summary of Real Estate Transfer Taxes by State (Aug.
15, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.realtor.org/library/library/fg717.

2010]

Nothing Natural About It

1355

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The second area of debate surrounding the stamp tax exemption
spurred a split among the federal circuit courts. This split hinged largely
on whether the stamp tax exemption includes a timing element in order
for a transfer to qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the dispute
related to the interpretation of the requirement that the transfer be made
“under a plan confirmed.” There were two schools of thought.43 The
Court of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits broadly followed
the “‘necessity’ interpretation,” requiring only that the transfer be necessary to the confirmation of a plan for the exemption to be valid. In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits followed a
“‘temporal limitation’ interpretation” of the stamp tax exemption, requiring that a transfer occur post-conformation for the exemption to be valid.
The circuit split developed in 1999 when the Fourth Circuit rejected
the Second Circuit’s more expansive necessity approach adopted in City
of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., and instead interpreted “under a
plan confirmed” as including a temporal limitation.44 This split has led
to an uncertainty regarding the scope of the tax exemption. After the
split developed, debtors in jurisdictions that had yet to rule on the issue
were left in a state of uncertainty as to whether their pre-confirmation
asset transfers would receive the same tax benefits as any postconfirmation transfers. The following discussion tracks the origins and
development of the circuit split. Specifically, section A discusses the
necessity interpretation, and then, section B discusses the temporal limitation interpretation. Both sections also discuss the problems that each
interpretation presents.
A. Necessary to the Confirmation of the Plan
The Second Circuit, as the first federal circuit court to address the
issue of whether the stamp tax exemption45 includes a temporal limitation, developed the necessity interpretation,46 which was eventually embraced by the majority of bankruptcy courts.47 The court developed the
necessity interpretation in City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender. 48 In Ja43. Throughout this Comment, the two predominant views will be referred to as the “‘necessity’ interpretation” and the “‘temporal limitation’ interpretation.”
44. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 456 (4th
Cir. 1999); City of New York v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc. (In re Jacoby-Bender, Inc.), 758 F.2d 840, 841
(2d Cir. 1985).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (2009).
46. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 840–41.
47. Leake & Douglas, supra note 7, at 855.
48. Jacoby-Bender, 758 F.2d at 840–41 (holding that the New York City Property Transfer Tax
is a “similar tax” under 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c)).
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coby-Bender, the court affirmed a bankruptcy decision, which held that
the delivery of a deed transferring a building to The Hearst Corporation
occurred under a confirmed reorganization plan and was thus exempt
from all stamp or similar taxes.49 While not a pre-confirmation transfer,
the sale at issue was a post-confirmation transfer that was not specifically
authorized by the reorganization plan but was necessary to the plan’s
consummation—the eventual emergence from bankruptcy.50
The City of New York argued that because the plan did not mention
the transfer nor provide authority to make the sale, delivery could not
have been made under the plan as required by the code.51 In rejecting
this argument, the court found that the statute does not require a specific
reorganization plan.52 It was sufficient that “the plan’s consummation
depended almost entirely upon the sale of the building.”53 Thus, the
Second Circuit’s decision stating that the transfer did not have to be included within the confirmed plan as long as the transfer was necessary
for the plan’s consummation created the necessity interpretation.
Bankruptcy courts and other federal circuit courts extended this already expansive view of the stamp tax exemption to sanction not only
those sales “necessary to the consummation of a plan, but [also] those
necessary to the confirmation of a plan.”54 Thus, under a plan confirmed
also applied to those transfers that took place before a plan was confirmed, so long as it was “necessary” or “essential” to the confirmation
of a plan.
Similarly, once the split developed,55 the Eleventh Circuit weighed
in on the issue and further expanded the scope of under a plan confirmed.56 In State of Florida, Department of Revenue v. T.H. Orlando
Ltd., the debtor, a hotel owner, filed an action against the Florida Department of Revenue seeking declaratory relief and requesting a refund
of $161,425 for stamp taxes paid in connection with a $29,350,000 mortgage refinancing.57 The issue the court considered was whether a trans-

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 840.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 456 (4th
Cir. 1999) (citing In re Smoss Enterprises Corp., 54 B.R. 950, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that a
sale was under a plan because “the transfer of property was essential to the confirmation of the
plan”)).
55. See infra Part III.B.
56. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. T.H. Orlando Ltd. et al. (In re T.H. Orlando Ltd.), 391 F.3d 1287
(11th Cir. 2004).
57. Id. at 1289–90.
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action between two non-debtors was exempt from the stamp taxes when
the transaction was specifically considered in the confirmed plan.58
The parties involved in the dispute did not include the debtor, but
rather an adjacent landowner and the new lender.59 Nonetheless, the
court found that without these two parties, the plan would never have
been consummated because the first lender would have foreclosed on the
mortgage, leaving the unsecured creditors with nothing.60 The court distinguished T.H. Orlando Ltd. from those cases where the transaction
could have been completed by other means, including an outright purchase.61 Here, the transfer was not irrelevant but essential because the
plan would have failed without it.62 Ultimately, the court held that under
a plan confirmed refers to a transfer that is necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.63, 64
Originating over twenty years ago in Jacoby-Bender, the necessity
interpretation has been embraced by numerous courts and applied to
transfers both pre- and post-confirmation. However, despite these endorsements, this interpretation is flawed. With little regulation, the use
of the tax provision has increased along with scope of the interpretation.65 Critics argue that the necessity interpretation sets a vague standard and creates a windfall for debtors at the expense of state taxing authorities.66 Recently, the trend has been to include a boilerplate provision
in the standard pre-confirmation asset sale motion, which usually seeks
to “avoid any taxes ‘under any law imposing a stamp or similar tax.’”67
However, this broad language, which is simply tacked on to the asset sale
motion, does not generally contain the amount of the tax or even the listing of the property being transferred.68 As a result, the state tax authorities argue they have no notice as to whether or not they will be affected
by the transfer.69 This practice then allows the debtor to take advantage

58. Id. at 1290.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1294.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1295.
63. Id.
64. Although the court did not address the precise issue of whether the stamp tax exemption
applies to pre-confirmation transfers, the court’s decision was a precursor to the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Piccadilly. See supra Part IV.A.
65. See Karen Cordy, The Incredible Expanding § 1146(c), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 21, 2003,
at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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of the exemption, while little is documented with either the court or the
city.70
This flaw spurs additional problems when the debtor utilizes the tax
exemption and then subsequently fails to confirm a plan. Only about
25% of Chapter 11 plans are confirmed; the vast majority of cases that
begin under Chapter 11 are dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 proceedings.71 Clearly, this was never Congress’s intent. Further, the taxing
authority argues that attempts to collect the tax from the debtor after the
fact are highly impractical because the state will face high administrative
costs in doing so.72
B. Temporal Limitation
The necessity interpretation of the stamp tax exemption dominated
the jurisdictions and was the only view endorsed by a circuit court until
the Fourth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and lower courts’ use of this
interpretation in NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts in
1999.73 In NVR, the Fourth Circuit rejected the necessity interpretation
and, instead, held that the stamp tax exemption includes a temporal limitation.74 NVR, a leading homebuilder, acquired Ryan Homes in an effort
to expand its business.75 NVR financed this deal, incurring over $450
billion in debt.76 Unable to meet its financial obligations, NVR filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.77 During the five-month period after filing
and before emerging from bankruptcy, NVR made 5,671 real property
transfers and incurred $8,439,103 in transfer and recordation taxes, the
majority of which were paid to the taxing authorities in Pennsylvania and
Maryland.78 Ultimately, the court concluded, “transfers taking place
prior to the date of the reorganization plan’s confirmation are not covered by [the stamp tax exemption].”79
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit cited the holding in
California State Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., in which
the court stated that, “[a]lthough Congress can confer an immunity from
state taxation, . . . a court must proceed carefully when asked to recog70. See id.
71. Transcript of Oral Argument, Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
2326 (No. 07-312), 2008 WL 791974 at *3–*4.
72. Id. at *18–*19.
73. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir.
1999).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 447.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 447.
78. Id. at 448.
79. Id. at 456.
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nize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”80 The court asserted that this passage dictates that courts must
narrowly construe tax provisions in favor of the state.81 Thus, using the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word “under,”82 which means
inferior or subordinate, the Fourth Circuit could not hold that a preconfirmation transfer could be subordinate to or authorized by something
that did not exist at the time of the transfer.83
In 2003, the Third Circuit entered the fray with Baltimore County v.
Hechinger Liquidation Trust84 and sided with the Fourth Circuit, agreeing that courts should take a restrictive approach when dealing with the
stamp tax exemption.85 Hechinger, a retailer of home and garden care
products, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in June of 1999.86 In October, Hechinger requested permission to make certain real estate sales
prior to confirmation of the plan.87 Hechinger’s motion also requested
that the court find the sales exempt from taxes under the stamp tax exemption provision.88
Despite objections by the taxing authorities that the proposed sales
were not being made under a confirmed plan, the bankruptcy court approved the sales and declared them exempt from transfer and recording
taxes.89 The Third Circuit, in an opinion authored by then Third Circuit
Judge Alito, reversed, holding that under a plan confirmed means “‘made
pursuant to the authority conferred by such a plan,’ and since an unconfirmed plan cannot confer such authority, this interpretation means that a
transfer made prior to plan confirmation cannot qualify for tax exemption.”90
In adopting this temporal limitation interpretation of under a plan
confirmed, the Third and Fourth Circuits asserted that transfers occurring
before a plan is confirmed, regardless of their importance to the plan, do
not qualify for the tax benefit. This assertion is based on a narrow and
strict textualist interpretation of under a plan confirmed. However, the
temporal limitation interpretation is not without its own fair share of crit80. Id. at 457 (citing Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844
(1989)).
81. Id.
82 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (6th ed. 1990)).
83. Id.
84. Baltimore County v. Hechinger Liquidation Trust (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc.),
335 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2003).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 246.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 246–47.
90. Id. at 254.
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ics.91 Critics of this interpretation argue that the temporal limitation (1)
draws an arbitrary line and, as a result, is under inclusive and (2) does
not comport with the practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization.92
First, critics argue that in limiting the scope of the provision, the
temporal limitation interpretation draws a strict line between transfers
that qualify for the transfer tax exemption and those that do not.93 A
transfer that is essential to the plan but occurs one day before plan confirmation is barred, while a transfer that occurs one day after will qualify
regardless of whether it is necessary or essential to the plan. One of the
goals of the stamp tax exemption is to provide tax relief to distressed
companies while encouraging asset sales to preserve any remaining value
and increase the debtor’s chance of a successful reorganization.94 The
line created by the temporal limitation arbitrarily limits the extension of
the tax provision to those debtors who can afford to wait for plan confirmation and rejects those debtors who need to sell assets earlier in order
to fund their reorganization.95
Second, critics argue that the temporal limitation fails to comport
with the practical realities of Chapter 11 reorganization.96 Because of
their numerous benefits, the increased use of pre-confirmation asset sales
will likely continue despite an inability to take advantage of the exemption, and less money will be available for creditors and reorganization.
The reality is that these transfer taxes are far too small to drive the timing
of an asset sale.97 The benefit to those who take the time and effort to
hold off on the deal until the plan has been confirmed will be nominal.
Furthermore, the numerous benefits associated with a pre-confirmation
asset sale—such as simplicity, speed, and the lack of liens and encum-

91. See, e.g., David Stratton, Real Property Transfers and Bankruptcy Tax Exemptions: In re
Hechinger and 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at 32; Lorenzo Marinuzzi
& Jordan Wishew, Piccadilly Cafeterias: Congress Should Revisit Supreme Court Bright Line Test,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 27, 2008, at 1.
92. Marinuzzi & Wishew, supra note 91.
93. See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 91.
94. See supra notes 32–34.
95. See Stratton, supra note 91.
96. Marinuzzi & Wishew, supra note 91.
97. Brief for the States of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 41, at
14. The brief stated the following:
In fact we know of no reported cases finding that but for the availability of the exemption, an assets sale would not have gone forward. Nor are there any reported cases finding
that a debtor was unable to confirm a plan because it had to pay the transfer tax on a preconfirmation sale.
Id. Moreover, companies continue with these transfers despite having to pay sales or capital gains
tax, which can range up to the high teens. Id.
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brances—serve as powerful incentives to “engage in these pre-plan
transactions, even without [the] minor added tax advantage.”98
In addition, even if the tax benefit is an attractive incentive, given
the recent trouble in the credit markets, companies will face additional
difficulties in obtaining the financing needed to fund the reorganization.
As a result, many debtors will be unable to postpone a sale until plan
confirmation solely to preserve the tax exemption. With the increase in
pre-confirmation asset sales, this use of the tax exemption provision will
also likely decline. Because the taxes will still need to be paid, either the
burden will be placed on the purchaser, hurting the bidding process, or
on the debtor, resulting in less proceeds from the sale. Either way, creditors will end up with less money.
IV. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE V. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
Less than twenty years after the circuit split developed, the Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision, settled the debate in Florida Department
of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.99 By issuing a “simple, bright
line rule” that the stamp tax exemption does not apply to an asset sale
made before the debtor’s plan is confirmed under Chapter 11, the majority of the Court squared largely with the temporal limitation interpretation
previously used by the Third and Fourth Circuits.100 This Part begins by
examining the background and procedural history of Piccadilly. Then,
this Part discusses the Court’s ruling in more detail, examining the arguments presented in the majority opinion and dissent.
A. Course of Bankruptcy Proceedings
In operation for over sixty years, Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly) was once one of the most successful and largest cafeteria chains in
the Southeast.101 However, due to financial difficulties, on October 29,
2003, Piccadilly declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.102 Piccadilly entered bankruptcy with the belief that an asset
sale would be the best way to maximize its enterprise value.103 The day
before filing, Piccadilly executed an asset purchase agreement with Piccadilly Acquisition Corporation (PAC), an affiliate of TruFoods Corpo98. Id. at 12.
99. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2329
(2006).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2230.
102. Id.
103. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) (Piccadilly I), 379 B.R. 215, 217 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128
S. Ct. 2326 (2006).
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ration, for the sale of all of Piccadilly’s assets for $54 million.104 With
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, Piccadilly also filed a
motion requesting leave to sell substantially all of its assets free and clear
of all liens, claims, encumbrances, and interests.105
Although Piccadilly had already entered into the purchase agreement, it requested the bankruptcy court’s permission to conduct an auction, which would entitle the highest bidder to purchase the assets.106 In
addition, Piccadilly requested that the sale be exempt from any stamp
taxes.107 Just over a month later, the Court approved the bidding process,
using PAC’s $54 million offer as the opening minimum bid.108 Ultimately, Piccadilly Investments, LLC had the winning bid of $80 million.109
Next, Piccadilly entered into a global settlement agreement (“Global Settlement”), which resolved the priority of distribution among Piccadilly’s creditors; Piccadilly contended that the Global Settlement was
“analogous to a confirmation of a plan.”110 In response, the bankruptcy
court conducted a sale hearing approving the asset sale to Piccadilly Investments, the Global Settlement, and the tax exemption on the sale under the stamp tax exemption provision.111
Four parcels of land were among the assets sold, and Florida asserted that each sale was subject to stamp taxes.112 Accordingly, the
Florida Department of Revenue filed a motion to reconsider the sale order.113 However, the bankruptcy court entered an amended sale order
over Florida’s objections, ultimately approving the sale.114 Shortly thereafter, Piccadilly filed its initial Chapter 11 plan and disclosure statement; it later filed an amended plan, to which Florida again objected, still
maintaining that it was entitled to collect the taxes.115 In addition, Flori-

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 218.
107. Id. at 217.
108. “As the initial bidder, Piccadilly Acquisition Corporation served as a so-called ‘stalking
horse’ whose initial research, due diligence, and subsequent bid may encourage later bidders. . . . For
its role, Piccadilly Acquisition Corporation was entitled to receive a breakup fee.” Id. at 218, n.6.
109. Id. at 218.
110. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.) (Piccadilly II), 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006).
111. Id.
112. Piccadilly I, 379 B.R. 215, 218 (S.D.Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.
2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006).
113. Piccadilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301.
114. The sale order was amended in order to alter the manner in which secured noteholders
could accept payment. Piccadilly I, 379 B.R. at 218 n.9. The asset sale closed the next day. Piccadilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301.
115. Piccadilly II, 484 F.3d at 1301.
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da initiated an adversary proceeding requesting a declaration that the asset sale was not exempt from stamp taxes.116
Almost seven months later, the bankruptcy court confirmed Piccadilly’s amended plan over the Department of Revenue’s objections.117
The court ruled that the tax exemption applied on the grounds that the
sale was necessary for the eventual consummation of the Chapter 11 reorganization plan.118
The district court and the Eleventh Circuit both affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the temporal limitations followed by the Third and
Fourth Circuits and instead held that “[transfer] tax exemptions may apply to those pre-confirmation transfers that are necessary to the consummation of a confirmed plan of reorganization, which at the very least,
requires that there be some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer
and the confirmed plan.”119 It is under these circumstances that Piccadilly was before the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
After years of confusion regarding the stamp tax exemption,120 the
Supreme Court finally granted certiorari. In resolving the circuit split,
the Supreme Court took a textualist approach to the stamp tax exemption121 and issued a bright line rule that the tax exemption only applies to
post-confirmation asset transfers.122
1. Majority Opinion
On June 16, 2008, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.123 The Court’s
analysis of the statute was broken into three parts: (1) the ambiguity of
the statute; (2) Piccadilly’s argument that even if not facially ambiguous,
the provision is ambiguous when compared to other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code; and (3) the canons of statutory construction asserted
by each party.124 This sub-section will address each of these issues in the
same order as the Court addressed them.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1304.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (2009).
121. Id. § 1146(a).
122. Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (Piccadilly III), 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2339
(2006).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 2331–39.
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The Court first addressed the ambiguity of the stamp tax exemption
language.125 Florida argued that the meaning of “under a plan confirmed” in the statute is not ambiguous. It asserted that the word “confirmed” is a past participle, modifying the word “plan.”126 As a past participle, “confirmed” indicates a completed action, meaning that a plan
confirmed denotes a confirmed plan or, in other words, a plan that has
been confirmed in the past.127
Moreover, Florida urged the Court to define the word “under” as
“with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate to” the confirmed
plan.128 In doing so, Florida referred to the two other uses of “under”
within the provision where “under” is clearly used as “subject to.”129
Evoking a similar argument to the one used in In re NVR, LP, Florida
asserted that to be eligible for the exemption, a transfer must be subject
to a confirmed plan, and likewise, a pre-confirmation transfer cannot be
made subject to a plan that does not exist at the time the transfer is
made.130
In contrast, Piccadilly argued that the stamp tax exemption does not
include a temporal requirement. Piccadilly asserted that “plan confirmed” and “confirmed plan” are not the same, and if Congress had indeed intended the latter, it would have used that language.131 In fact, in a
related provision, § 1142(b), Congress did use “confirmed plan.”132 Piccadilly also rejected Florida’s proposed definition of “under,” arguing
that one could just as easily read the term as “in accordance with” and
pointing out that the numerous dictionary definitions demand the meaning be drawn from the context surrounding the term.133 If nothing else,
125. Id. at 2331–33; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (“The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a
security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed . . . , may not
be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.”).
126. “[I].e., ‘[a] verb form indicating past or completed action or time that is used as a verbal
adjective in phrases such as baked beans and finished work.’” Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2331
(citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1287 (4th ed. 2000)).
127. Id. at 2331–32.
128. Id. at 2332.
129. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1146(a) (“The issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the
making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this
title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.”) (emphasis added).
130. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2232; see discussion supra Part III.B.
131. Id.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2009) (“The court may direct the debtor and any other necessary
party to execute or deliver or to join in the execution or delivery of any instrument required to effect
a transfer of property dealt with by a confirmed plan, and to perform any other act, including the
satisfaction of any lien, that is necessary for the consummation of the plan.”) (emphasis added).
133. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2332. The court summarized Piccadilly’s argument as follows:
[Piccadilly] observes that the variability of the term “under” is well-documented, noting
that the American Heritage Dictionary 1395 (1976) provides 15 definitions, including
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Piccadilly argued, the language of the stamp tax exemption could have at
least more than one interpretation.
Conceding that both sides proffered credible interpretations, the
Court concluded that Florida’s interpretation of “under a plan confirmed”
is the better one.134 While admitting that Congress could have been
clearer, the Court viewed Florida’s interpretation as a simpler construction and the more natural reading of the statute, noting that Piccadilly’s
version places a “greater strain on the statutory text.”135
The Court next addressed Piccadilly’s argument that even if not facially ambiguous, the provision is ambiguous when compared to other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.136 Piccadilly again asserted that
Congress would have included a temporal limitation, as it did in other
code provisions, if it had intended for there to be one. Because the stamp
tax exemption lacks an explicit temporal provision, Piccadilly argued
that the Court must presume that Congress acted intentionally when excluding the language.137
Piccadilly also proffered several examples of code provisions where
using Florida’s definition of “under” as “authorized by” would not comport with the meaning of the provision. For example, the term “under” in
§ 303(a), which reads “[a]n involuntary case may be commenced only
under chapter 7 or 11 of this title,” cannot mean “authorized by” because
§ 303(a) itself authorizes involuntary cases and the provisions of Chapters 7 and 11 do not.138 Thus, Piccadilly contended that “under” is ambiguous.139
Florida rejected Piccadilly’s argument on the grounds that it would
be redundant for Congress to include any further temporal limitation.140
Florida argued that the stamp tax exception must apply to postconfirmation transfers because of its location within the code.141 The
subchapter within which the stamp tax exemption is located is entitled

“[i]n view of,” “because of,” “by virtue of,” as well as “[s]ubject to the restraint . . . of.”
See also Ardestani (citation omitted) (recognizing that “[t]he word ‘under’ has many dictionary definitions and must draw its meaning from its context”). Although “under” appears several times in [the stamp tax exemption], Piccadilly maintains there is no reason
why a term of such common usage and variable meaning must have the same meaning
each time it is used, even in the same sentence.
Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2333.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2333–34.
139. Id. at 2334.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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“POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS.”142 Basing its argument on the
textual canon of statutory interpretation that suggests a court should interpret a code in its context and consistent with the chapter within which
it appears, Florida claimed the tax exemption should apply only to postconfirmation transfers as dictated by the heading.143
Siding again with Florida, the Court rejected Piccadilly’s argument
that the statute is ambiguous when compared to other provisions of the
code.144 If anything, the Court found Piccadilly’s arguments to support
the opposite conclusion—that the statutory context suggests that the
stamp tax exemption is inapplicable to pre-confirmation transfers.145
The Court finally focused on the four substantive canons of statutory construction asserted within the parties’ arguments. Florida’s arguments included two canons: (1) “Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change;”146 and (2) courts
should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from
state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”147
Florida contended that the language within the tax exemption provision has remained the same since 1978, despite several revisions to the
Bankruptcy Code, including the most recent 2005 BAPCPA revision that
occurred before the Eleventh Circuit’s decision below.148 Because Congress re-adopted the stamp tax provision as § 1146 (a) with the exact
same language, Florida asserted that Congress ratified the longstanding
temporal limitation as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit in NVR and the
Third Circuit in Hechinger.149
Florida also contended that the federalism principle articulated in
Sierra Summit—that courts should proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly
expressed—demands that the provision be strictly construed in favor of

142. Id.
143. Id. at 2234–35 (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It’s
a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”)).
144. Id. at 2335.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2336 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978)). The BAPCPA
amendments occurred in 2005, before the Eleventh Circuit’s Piccadilly decision, but after the Fourth
Circuit decided NVR and the Third Circuit decided Hechinger, both of which held that preconfirmation transfers were not tax exempt.
147. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2336–37 (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra
Summit, Inc. 490 U.S. 844, 851–52 (1989)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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the states to prevent “unwarranted displacement of their tax laws.”150
Furthermore, Florida argued that this canon also discouraged the extension of the exemption to pre-confirmation transfers because it is a direct
interference with the administration of a state’s taxation scheme, which,
in this case, is imposed “prior to recordation” of the transfer instrument.151 In response, Piccadilly asserted that when the exemption from
state taxation is clearly expressed, the canon is inapplicable.152 Thus,
because here Congress clearly intended to exempt a category of state
taxation, the federalism canon argument must fail.153
Piccadilly continued by offering two additional substantive canons
to support its arguments: (1) “provisions allowing preferences must be
tightly construed,”154 and (2) “a remedial statute such as the Bankruptcy
Code should be liberally construed.”155 First, Piccadilly maintained that
Florida’s stamp tax is the equivalent of a preference in favor of a particular claimant. Arguing that Florida’s stamp tax is nothing more than a
post-petition claim or administrative expense that is paid ahead of most
creditors’ pre-petition claims, Piccadilly asserted that a narrow interpretation of the stamp tax exemption “is not only inconsistent with the policy of equality distribution” but also “dilutes the value of the priority for
those creditors Congress intended to prefer.”156
Second, Piccadilly reasoned that the Court should construe the
Bankruptcy Code liberally because the tax exemption provision is a remedial statute.157 Piccadilly asserted that the tax exemption’s main purpose is to facilitate the Chapter 11 process by providing tax relief.158 As
a result, the courts should interpret any ambiguities in the text in a manner that furthers the policy goals of maximizing asset value and, thus, the
property available for creditors.159
The Court, finding Florida’s federalism canon argument to be decisive, declined to interpret the statute liberally.160 Justice Thomas wrote
that interpreting the statute liberally would be “recognizing an exemption

150. Id. at 2337.
151. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 201.01, 201.02(1) (2006)).
152. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2337.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667
(2006)).
155. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2337.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2337–38.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 2338.
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from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed.”161 Moreover, the Court found that Piccadilly’s argument proves this point; because Piccadilly rested its case on the assertion that the language of the
stamp tax exemption is ambiguous as opposed to express, it follows that
Congress could not have intended the exemption to apply to preconfirmation transfers.162
The Court also rejected both of Piccadilly’s substantive canons,
finding both inapplicable. First, although preferences must be tightly
construed, the Court found that the stamp tax exemption is not a preference granting provision and makes no mention of preferences within the
text.163 Second, the Court declined to interpret the statute liberally in
order to serve its remedial purpose because interpreting the provision in
this way would “stretch the disallowance wall beyond what the statutory
text can naturally bear.”164 While the Court acknowledged the practical
realities of Chapter 11 reorganizations and the various policy goals behind the Bankruptcy Code, it left the ultimate decision to revise the provision to the legislature rather than the judiciary.165
In summation, the Court adopted the bright line rule that “section
1146 affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a
Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed.”166
2. The Dissenting Justices Rejection of the Temporal Interpretation
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer167 and joined by
Justice Souter, rejected the majority opinion, characterized the language
of the stamp tax exemption as ambiguous, and argued the necessity interpretation is more appropriate.168 Justice Breyer disagreed with the
majority’s textualist approach and asserted that in the “absence of a clear
answer in text or canons,” he would prefer looking towards the exemption’s purpose—to encourage and facilitate bankruptcy asset sales.169
The dissenters acknowledged that the pre-confirmation bankruptcy
process is time consuming and that there are circumstances where the
debtor must sell assets quickly, rather than wait for confirmation, in or161. Id. at 2338 (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844,
851–52 (1989)).
162. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2338.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2339.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2339–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, unsurprisingly, was also the most
hostile during oral arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No.
07-312), 2008 WL 791974.
168. See Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2339–42.
169. Id. at 2341–42.
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der to preserve the maximum value of the asset.170 Recognizing first that
a pre-confirmation asset sale is a valuable tool for generating more revenue for creditors and second that stamp taxes accomplish the inverse by
reducing the funds available, Justice Breyer made clear that the majority’s opinion failed to accomplish Congress’s primary objectives in enacting the stamp tax exemption.171 By limiting the statute’s application to
narrow circumstances, the majority’s rationale actually leads to an inapposite result.
The dissenting Justices believed the majority’s rule was inappropriate and suggested a different standard. Justice Breyer expanded on his
critique of the majority’s approach, asserting that the bright line rule
could harm creditors.172 The threat of losing the stamp tax exemption
may influence the debtor to forego the extra revenue generated in a quick
asset sale in order to protect the exemption under the longer confirmation
process.173 This forgone revenue in turn decreases the amount of money
available to the estate and to creditors. Frustrated by these results, Justice Breyer advocated for a more flexible standard.174
What conceivable reason could Congress have had for silently writing into the statute’s language a temporal distinction with such consequences? The majority can find none. It simply says that the result is not ‘absurd’ and notes the advantages of a ‘bright line
rule.’ . . . I agree that the majority’s interpretation is not absurd and
do not dispute the advantages of a clear rule. But I think the statute
supplies a clear enough rule—transfers are exempt when there is
confirmation and are not exempt when there is no confirmation.
And I see no reason to adopt the majority’s preferred construction
where it conflicts with the statute’s purpose.175

Breyer intended his proposed rule to be administratively workable, while
at the same time, avoiding results that appear contrary to the statute’s
purpose.
Ultimately, while the Supreme Court’s decision does offer a bright
line rule, the Court only chose the lesser of two evils; the majority sided
with the temporal limitation interpretation, while the dissenters endorsed
the necessity interpretation. Unfortunately, the Court provided no new
insight or solutions, and the problems associated with the stamp tax exemption and both interpretations remain.
170. Id. at 2342.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2341.
175. Id. at 2343.
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As the rule currently stands, the end result is less money for creditors, regardless of which route a debtor chooses. On one hand, if the
debtor chooses to continue with a pre-plan asset sale, the debtor will
generally be able to realize a higher value for the assets through higher
and more numerous bids but will be forced to pay the tax. On the other
hand, if the debtor waits until there is a confirmed plan in order to take
advantage of the tax exemption, the debtor runs the risk of a lowered bid
(if any), the depreciation of the asset, as well as the administrative costs
of owning and maintaining the asset before plan confirmation. Indeed,
by choosing to sell its assets before its reorganization plan was confirmed, Piccadilly was able to realize a sale of $80 million through the
bidding war created by the pre-plan asset sale process.176 This sale price
is significantly higher than the $54 million offer made before Piccadilly
filed for bankruptcy.177 These results do not fit with the legislative intent
behind the stamp tax exemption, and in the end, if the Piccadilly ruling
does not comport with the policies of bankruptcy, then Congress must reevaluate the provision.
V. CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Piccadilly and adoption of the
temporal limitation interpretation has resulted in a strict rule that, while
easy to apply, is riddled with problems. The Court imposed an arbitrary
timing requirement, completely disregarded congressional intent, and
failed to develop a rule that comports with the practical realities of bankruptcy. With the increase in pre-confirmation asset sales, the tax exemption provision, specifically carved out by Congress over 100 years ago,
will eventually lose its utility, if it has not already.
In response to these concerns, many commentators have called for
congressional intervention.178 Removing the temporal limitation and
adding a notice provision will satisfy the critics while maintaining the
benefits of the bright line rule. Combining established boundaries with a
more flexible provision that comports with the practical realities of bankruptcy will increase transparency and not only strike a middle ground
between debtors and the state taxing authorities, but also further the
Code’s underlying purpose.
176. See supra notes 108–09.
177. See Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.)
(Piccadilly I), 379 B.R. 215, 218 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007),
rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2006).
178. Indeed, the majority in Piccadilly noted that Congress is the one who must determine if
the provision should be revised. Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. at 2339 (“It is incumbent upon the Legislature, and not the Judiciary, to determine whether § 1146 is in need of revision.”).
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The following discussion urges Congress to implement a proposed
revision and details the proposal’s advantages, such as its furtherance of
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and its more accurate tracking of
the legislative intent. Next, the discussion explains the problems with
removing the timing requirement and suggests a notice requirement. Finally, this discussion addresses potential concerns with the proposed revision.
A. Removal of the Temporal Limitation
Congress’s most straightforward option is to remove the temporal
limitation from the stamp tax exemption altogether. Aligning with the
view adopted by the Second and Eleventh circuits pre-Piccadilly, such a
revision would allow for the exemption of both pre- and postconfirmation transfer taxes. The most sensible version to adopt is the
version proffered by the Eleventh Circuit in Piccadilly, which would remove the temporal limitation, restrict the exemption to only those transactions that are necessary to the confirmation of the plan, and require a
nexus between the sale and the confirmation of the plan.
First, to avoid confusion, the suggested new provision should include the language used in the previous versions of the stamp tax exemption; specifically, the revised stamp tax exemption should use the language, “to make effective a plan” rather than “under a plan confirmed.”
This revision would remove the temporal limitation while retaining the
requirement of a nexus between the transfer and the eventual plan confirmation. The tax exemption would apply to both pre- and postconfirmation transfers, but it would only be valid if the transfer was a
part of the debtor’s plan, which could be confirmed before or after the
transfer.
Unfortunately, the above revision does little to appease the many
critics of the current stamp tax exemption or to address the reasons the
exemption was the subject of litigation. States would still not receive
notice of these transactions, and the revision would still place the heavy
administrative burden of preventing abuse of the exemption solely on the
state. In addition, the lack of regulation surrounding the provisions
would increase the probability of overly expansive use.179 This problem,
however, can be remedied with a simple notice provision.

179. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Rev. v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. (In re Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.)
(Piccadilly II), 484 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008). One of Florida’s arguments for finding a temporal limitation within the tax exemption provision is the complete
lack of notice of these transfers provided to states. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5, Piccadilly III,
128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008) (No 07-312), 2008 WL 742920.
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B. Notice Provision
With the current provision, there is inadequate notice because, although a pre-plan asset sale order will contain the court’s order exempting the parties from the stamp tax, only parties in interest180 are notified
of the pre-plan sale.181 The state taxing authority is not considered a party in interest and thus never hears of the exemption and has no opportunity to object to its use. This problem was exemplified in NVR, where
over 5,000 transfers of property occurred, each one exempt from stamp
taxes.182 The state never received notice of these transactions.183 In order to provide some semblance of enforcement of the provision, the state
bore the high costs of monitoring the parties’ actions. Taxing authorities
argue that to force the authorities to monitor pre-plan transactions completely contradicts the premise behind stamp taxes, which are to be virtually automatic upon recording.184
Fortunately, these concerns can be resolved easily with a notice
provision either included as a statutory revision within the Code, or, as
this author suggests, promulgated by the Supreme Court in the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.185 In relevant part, the proposed notice
provision would provide:
Notice to Taxing Authorities. The clerk, or some other person as
the court may direct, shall give the debtor, all creditors, and indenture trustees not less than 20 days notice by mail of any proposed
tax exemption pursuant to § 1146(a) of the Code. All notices required by this subdivision shall be mailed to the Internal Revenue
Service at its address set out in the register maintained under Rule
5003(e) in which the case is pending; and to any state taxing authority to which the debtor or any other party to the issuance, transfer,
or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer will become indebted to as a result of the issuance,
transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an
180. The Code does not expressly define the term “party in interest.” See generally 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2009). However, under Chapter 11, it is generally stated that “[a] party in interest, including
the debtor, the trustee, a creditor’s committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an
equity security holder, or an indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue
in a case under this chapter.” Id. § 1109(b).
181. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002.
182. NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442, 448
(4th Cir. 1999).
183. Id.
184. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No. 07-312), 2008
WL 791974.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2009). Congress has authorized the federal judiciary to prescribe the
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence for the federal courts, subject to the ultimate legislative
right of Congress to reject, modify, or defer any of the rules. Id. The authority and procedures for
promulgating rules are set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Id. §§ 2071–2077.

2010]

Nothing Natural About It

1373

instrument of transfer. Notice of a tax-exempt issuance, transfer, or
exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an instrument
of transfer shall include the time and place of any public sale, the
terms and conditions of any private sale, and the time fixed for filing objections. Notice shall also include the amount of the tax to be
exempt and a general description of the property at issue.

In the cases where the transfer is eventually part of the confirmed
plan, the above notice provision will address many of the state taxing
authorities’ concerns regarding the lack of notice and the high monitoring costs. The concerns that still need to be addressed include issues that
arise where the plan is never confirmed and the case is either dismissed
or converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding. The following discussion addresses how the proposed notice provision will affect these situations.
The proposed revision will solve the problem of applying the tax
exemption to unconfirmed plans. As previously noted, only 25% of
plans are confirmed.186 The vast majority of the cases are dismissed or
converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.187 With the proposed notice provision, these cases will no longer present an issue to the state taxing authorities. Although the state taxing authorities will still bear some monitoring costs, those costs will be greatly reduced because the notice provision will take the guessing game out of the process. Simply stating in the
proposed order that “any transfer taxes are exempt” would no longer be
sufficient. The debtor would be required to include specifics relating to
the proposed transfers. This reporting would require minimal paperwork
for the debtor and the state taxing authorities would now have detailed
information about each potential stamp tax exemption.
The notice provision will also allow the state to plan accordingly, to
ensure it gets priority over other creditors. For example, consider a preconfirmation asset sale, which has to be approved by the court. As soon
as the taxing authority receives notice of the proposed sale, it could submit its own proposed order stating that in the event the plan is not confirmed, the state already has an allowed administrative claim for the
amount of the stamp or transfer tax.188 Then, if the debtor converts from

186. See supra note 71.
187. Id.
188. “[A] governmental unit shall not be required to file a request for the payment of an expense described in subparagraph (B) or (C), as a condition of its being an allowed administrative
expense.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2009). Subparagraph (B) states that “any tax—incurred by the
estate, whether secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which liability is in rem, in personam, or both, except a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title.” 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(1)(B) (2009).
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Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, this administrative claim will become a prepetition claim.189
By claiming the tax as an administrative claim, the state taxing authority would be securing its position in line with other creditors. With
the exceptions of secured claims and domestic support obligations, administrative expenses have the highest priority in a bankruptcy proceeding.190 However, it is unlikely that there would be any domestic support
obligations in a former Chapter 11 case, thus placing the administrative
expenses at the front of the distribution line. While Chapter 7 administrative expenses would be paid before Chapter 11 administrative expenses,191 it is entirely possible that there would be enough money in the
estate for both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 administrative claims, meaning
the state taxing authority would be sure to receive payment. In the alternative, when there is enough money for Chapter 7 administrative claims
but not quite enough to cover all of the Chapter 11 administrative claims,
the Chapter 11 administrative claims would still be entitled to receive a
pro rata distribution.192
The only scenario in which the state taxing authority would not be
paid on its administrative claims is if the debtor is “administratively insolvent,” meaning there are insufficient funds in the case to pay all the
expenses of administration193 or any unsecured creditors. This result is
not uncommon within the Code, however, because one of the main purposes behind the Code is to treat each similarly situated creditor the
same. The state taxing authority cannot fault the Code for this result, nor
should it expect to receive any special treatment.
Some courts and commentators have suggested the use of escrow
accounts to help solve this problem.194 However, a notice requirement is
a superior solution. The escrow scheme, as used in In re 310 Associates

189. 11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (2009).
A claim against the estate or the debtor that arises after the order for relief but before
conversion in a case that is converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, other than a claim specified in section 503(b) of this title, shall be treated for all purposes as
if such claim had arisen immediately before the date of the filing of this petition.
Id.
190. Id. §§ 507(a)(1)–(2) (2009).
191. Id. § 726(b).
192. See id.
193. A debtor is deemed “administratively insolvent” when there is insufficient unencumbered
cash in the case to pay all expenses of administration under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) in full.
194. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, 30–32, Piccadilly III, 128 S. Ct. 2326 (No.
07-312), 2008 WL 791974 (questioning the use of escrow accounts, Justice Souter asked, “[I]sn’t it
odd that the Congress would have required, we will assume, this escrow procedure when the odds
are three to one against the non-taxability?”).
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L.P.,195 allows for the sale to take place and the stamp tax to be placed in
an escrow account. The amount of the stamp tax remains in the escrow
account until the debtor is able to confirm the plan. If the transfer is
made under a confirmed plan, then the funds in the escrow account are
refunded to the debtor. Conversely, if the transfer is not under the confirmed plan or a plan is never confirmed (e.g., if the debtor converts to
Chapter 7), the funds in the escrow account are transferred to the appropriate taxing authority.
Though use of escrow accounts resolves part of this problem, their
use in fact fails to comport with the policies behind the Code because
such accounts would upend the priority structure and ruin the distribution
scheme. The use of an escrow account would give the taxing authority
priority over all creditors. The taxing authority, as a government entity,
is already accounted for within the administrative expenses provision.
To remove them from this category, and give them ultimate priority over
all other creditors would again subvert the Code’s purpose of providing
equal treatment to all similarly situated creditors.
Further, the taxing authority’s concern that the case might ultimately be dismissed rather than converted does not warrant the use of escrow
accounts. When a Chapter 11 case is dismissed, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, the taxing authority would still be treated as a post-petition
creditor because the claim arose after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
Whether considering dismissal or conversion, the court must decide
which route is in the best interest of the creditors, including those with
post-petition claims.196 Making this decision means that if a Chapter 11
case has been dismissed, the court has decided that the creditors, including the state tax authority, will fare better outside of bankruptcy. Again,
the state can have little issue with this position. By explicitly setting
forth a procedure, the Code has been designed to allow for this uncertainty and to give the state any other position goes against the Code in its
entirety.
195. 282 B.R. 295, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The bankruptcy court’s order approving the
transfer agreement between the debtor and the purchaser provided as follows:
As soon as practicable after the Closing, the Debtor shall be, and hereby is, authorized to
deposit in a separate, interest bearing escrow account, monies from the Account (as defined herein below [sic]), earmarked “310 Associates, L.P.-City 1146(c) taxes,” the sum
of $100,000, or such other amount as may be necessary (the “Escrowed Funds”) to pay
any City real property transfer tax or any other City stamp or similar tax, and any potential interest and/or penalties thereon that may be due on the recordation of any documents
or instruments reflecting the sale of the Assets subject to this Order. . . . If a Plan of Reorganization in this case ultimately is not confirmed, the City may apply to this Court for
appropriate relied, and this Order is without prejudice to the rights of the City in such
eventuality.
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2009).
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With the proposed notice provision, the situation in Piccadilly
could have been avoided. The Florida Department of Revenue would
have received notice of the sale without the unnecessary and burdensome
monitoring costs, and Piccadilly would have still benefited from the
stamp tax exemption. In essence, the application of the stamp tax exemption would no longer be a zero sum game. Analyzing the Piccadilly
decision in this way highlights the restrictive nature of the temporal limitation and just how simple it would be to ensure the policy behind the
Bankruptcy Code is supported.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the current economic crisis upon us, the reality is that the
stamp tax exemption will have little effect on either a debtor’s ability or
willingness to reorganize. The excessive debt leverage, economic downturn, and lack of available credit in the credit market will force more and
more companies into pre-confirmation asset sales. It is unlikely that
lenders will be willing to risk the additional time and cost of confirming
the plan needed for reorganization. If the purpose behind the special tax
provisions is to promote reorganization and provide a greater chance of
emerging on the other side, as this author believes it to be, then Congress
must consider revising the provision or risk losing the provision’s utility.
In revising the provision, Congress should require a nexus between any
transfer and the confirmed plan as well as the use of a notice provision in
order to provide safeguards for both the states and the debtors alike.

